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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-3752 
___________ 
 
SHAWN WHITENIGHT, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE;  
MAJOR TYREE BLOCHER; JOHN DOE 1, State Police Trooper; 
 JOHN DOE 2, State Police Trooper; JOHN DOE 3, State Police Trooper;  
JOHN DOE 4, State Police Trooper;  
OFFICER MICKEY STORMER, Brookville Police Department  
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. No. 2-16-00553) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 1, 2016 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed: January 4, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Shawn Whitenight, an inmate, appeals the District Court’s orders dismissing his 
civil rights lawsuit and denying his motion for reconsideration.  We will affirm.  
 On April 22, 2016, see Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988), Whitenight 
filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that several police officers used excessive 
force when they arrested him on December 17, 2013.  On July 26, 2016, Whitenight filed 
a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, to which he attached a proposed 
amended complaint.  On August 10, 2016, the District Court issued an order granting him 
leave to file the amended complaint but dismissing it on the basis that the civil rights 
claims were time-barred.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
Whitenight then filed a timely motion for reconsideration.  The District Court 
denied the motion.  Whitenight timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See Allah v. 
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  We may summarily affirm if the appeal 
presents no substantial questions.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint.  See Allah, 229 
F.3d at 223.  We review the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the District 
Court’s judgment for abuse of discretion.  N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 
52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).     
When screening a complaint under § 1915, a district court may sua sponte dismiss 
the complaint as untimely under the statute of limitations where the defense is obvious 
from the complaint and no development of the factual record is required.  See Fogle v. 
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Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006); Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 
648, 656-57 (4th Cir. 2006); Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 
2001); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995).  For § 1983 actions based on conduct 
in Pennsylvania, the statute of limitations is two years from the date the claim accrued.  
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(2); Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).  A 
claim accrues “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which 
[his] action is based.”  Kach, 589 F.3d at 634 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
The events which gave rise to this litigation occurred on December 17, 2013.  
Whitenight filed his complaint on April 22, 2016, or two years and four months later.  
Whitenight argued, however, that his claims were timely on the basis of the discovery 
rule.  The discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until a plaintiff, exercising 
reasonable diligence, actually discovers his injury.  Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 367 
(3d Cir. 2000).  Whitenight contended that the discovery rule was applicable because he 
did not become aware of his injuries until he received the results of a May 14, 2014 MRI 
scan at a hospital. 
As the District Court correctly noted, the face of Whitenight’s amended complaint 
belies his assertion that he did not become aware of his injuries until he received the 
results of the later-acquired medical test.  Whitenight stated in the amended complaint 
that while he was being arrested on December 17, 2013, he “advised [the officers] he was 
in a lot of pain from the excessive force,” that after he was brought to the police station 
he “advised [an officer] of being in pain, could not sit down due to the pain,” and that for 
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the next few days he “could not move from the pain or even eat.”  Doc. No. 35-2 at ¶¶ 35, 
42, 46.  As Whitenight was aware of his injuries when he was being arrested, which was 
over two years before he filed this lawsuit, the District Court correctly concluded that his 
claims were untimely.  See Kach, 589 F.3d at 634.  
Because this appeal presents us with no substantial question, we will summarily 
affirm the judgment of the District Court.  See 3rd Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  We 
also deny Whitenight’s request for appointment for counsel.1 
 
                                              
1 In its August 24, 2016 order denying the motion for reconsideration, the District Court 
also addressed Whitenight’s motion to join the claims in this lawsuit with those he has 
filed against the county jail and the state prison where he was held after he was arrested.  
The District Court denied the motion as moot because it was filed after the amended 
complaint was dismissed as untimely, and further noted that “[e]ven if [Whitenight] had 
brought all of his claims in one civil action initially, the Court would have still dismissed 
the claims against the arresting officers as untimely filed.”  We agree with the District 
Court’s analysis, and conclude that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.  
See Thompson v. Boggs, 33 F.3d 847, 858 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that denial of joinder 
motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion).    
